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Abstract. SCADA protocols for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are
vulnerable to network attacks such as session hijacking. Hence, research
focuses on network anomaly detection based on meta–data (message
sizes, timing, command sequence), or on the state values of the phys-
ical process. In this work we present a class of semantic network-based
attacks against SCADA systems that are undetectable by the above men-
tioned anomaly detection. After hijacking the communication channels
between the Human Machine Interface (HMI) and Programmable Logic
Controllers (PLCs), our attacks cause the HMI to present a fake view of
the industrial process, deceiving the human operator into taking manual
actions. Our most advanced attack also manipulates the messages gen-
erated by the operator’s actions, reversing their semantic meaning while
causing the HMI to present a view that is consistent with the attempted
human actions. The attacks are totaly stealthy because the message sizes
and timing, the command sequences, and the data values of the ICS’s
state all remain legitimate.
We implemented and tested several attack scenarios in the test lab of
our local electric company, against a real HMI and real PLCs, separated
by a commercial-grade firewall. We developed a real-time security as-
sessment tool, that can simultaneously manipulate the communication
to multiple PLCs and cause the HMI to display a coherent system–wide
fake view. Our tool is configured with message-manipulating rules writ-
ten in an ICS Attack Markup Language (IAML) we designed, which may
be of independent interest. Our semantic attacks all successfully fooled
the operator and brought the system to states of blackout and possible
equipment damage.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are used for monitoring and controlling nu-
merous industrial systems and processes. In particular, ICS are used in critical
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2infrastructure assets such as chemical plants, electric power generation, trans-
mission and distribution systems, water distribution networks, and waste water
treatment facilities. ICS have a strategic significance due to the potentially seri-
ous consequences of a fault or malfunction.
ICS typically incorporate sensors and actuators that are controlled by PLCs,
and which are themselves managed by the HMI. PLCs are computer-based de-
vices that were originally designed to perform the logic functions executed by
electromechanical hardware (relays, switches, mechanical timer, and mechanical
counters). An automation system within a campus is usually referred to as a
Distributed Control Systems (DCS), while Supervisory Control And Data Ac-
quisition (SCADA) system is a type of ICS that typically comprises of different
stations distributed over large geographical areas.
Most SCADA network traffic is generated by automated processes and mainly
for data acquisition, in the form of periodic polling of field devices. The control is
done by commands that are used to change the operation state of the PLC and/or
its controlled equipment, e.g., a circuit switch. Provision against unauthorized
actions are system- or process-dependent.
ICS were originally designed for serial communications, and were built on the
premise that all the operating entities would be legitimate, properly installed,
perform the intended logic and follow the protocol. Thus, many ICS have almost
no measures for defending against deliberate attacks. Specifically, ICS network
components do not verify the identity and permissions of other components with
which they interact (i.e., no authentication and authorization mechanisms); they
do not verify message content and legitimacy (i.e., no data integrity checks); and
all the data sent over the network is in plaintext (i.e., no encryption to preserve
confidentiality). Therefore, ICS networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks, and in
particular to session–hijacking attacks.
Anomaly–based intrusion detection approaches are based on “the belief that
an intruder’s behavior will be noticeably different from that of a legitimate
user” [34]. The main types of anomaly detection approaches that are applied
to SCADA systems [3,4,11] are: Network–aware detection in which the anomaly
detection models only consider network and OS-level events; Protocol–aware de-
tection in which modeling the normal traffic relies on deep-packet-inspection and
considers the SCADA control protocol’s meta-data (message sizes, timing, argu-
ment addresses, command sequence); and Process–aware approaches which are
based on process invariants, mathematical relationships among physical proper-
ties of the process controlled by the PLCs.
1.2 Contributions
In this work we present a class of semantic network–based attacks against SCADA
systems, that are undetectable by either protocol–aware or process–aware ano-
maly detection. After hijacking the communication channels between the HMI
and PLCs, our attacks manipulate the traffic so as to cause the HMI to present
a fake view of the industrial process, thus deceiving the human operator into
taking inappropriate and damaging manual actions. Our most advanced attack
3also manipulates the messages generated by the operator’s actions, reversing the
semantic meaning of commands (‘Close’ becomes ‘Open’ and vice-versa) while
causing the HMI to present a view that is consistent with the attempted human
actions—thus inducing real damage on the cyber-physical system.
Our attacks are totaly stealthy to SCADA-aware anomaly detectors since
the message sizes and timing, and also the command sequences (including the
command arguments) are all 100% legitimate in every way. Furthermore, our
attacks are undetectable even by process-aware anomaly detection, since the
observed data values of the ICS’s state are completely legitimate: they appear as
natural fault conditions that the SCADA system is designed for, and the human
operator is trained to handle. Even the operator’s manual command sequences
are the expected actions when responding to a natural fault.
We implemented and tested several attack scenarios in the test lab of our local
electric company, against a real HMI and real PLCs, separated by a commercial-
grade firewall. To do so we developed a real-time security assessment tool, that
can simultaneously manipulate the Modbus communication between the HMI
and multiple PLCs, and cause the HMI to display a coherent system–wide fake
view.
Our tool is configured with message-manipulating rules written in an ICS At-
tack Markup Language (IAML) we designed. Our tool is near-stateless—it only
replaces message contents, without injecting, deleting, extending, or shortening
messages. In one scenario we even used the tool in a “half-duplex” mode, wherein
it only manipulates the HMI-to-PLC queries, while the PLC-to-HMI responses
are unaltered. Despite these self–imposed limitations, our multi-stage semantic
attacks all successfully fooled the operator and brought the system to states of
blackout and possible equipment damage.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains some fun-
damentals and assumptions. Section 3 describes the security assessment tool.
In Sction 4 we present three attacks we tested with their impact on the HMI
and the PLCs. Section 5 describes the ICS Attack Markup Language (IAML).
Section 6 succinctly reviews related work and in Section 7, we suggest possi-
ble countermeasures and conclusions. Examples of IAML can be found in an
Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Modbus
Modbus is a de facto standard for ICS. Many Modbus systems implement the
communications layer using TCP as described in the Modbus over TCP/IP spec-
ification [33]. The specification defines an embedding of Modbus packets in TCP
segments. TCP port 502 is reserved for Modbus communications. The Modbus
protocol employs a simple master-slave communication mode. The master device
initiates transactions (called queries) and the slaves respond by supplying the
requested data to the master or by performing the action requested in the query.
4Fig. 1: Basic Structure of the Electric System (following [1])
Only one device can be designated as the master (usually the HMI) while the
remaining devices are slaves (usually PLCs). A slave sends a response message
for every query that is addressed to it. A unique transaction ID is created for
the request message from the master, which the slave includes in its response.
Each PLC provides an interface based on the Modbus data model. The data
model is comprised of “coil” (single-bit) and “register” (16-bit) tables. Read and
write operations associated with these items can access multiple consecutive
data items. The Modbus PDU has two fields that refer to the data model: a
single-byte Function code and a variable size Payload (limited to 252 bytes),
which contains parameters that are specific to the function code. A read request
payload has two fields, a reference number and bit/word count. The reference
number field specifies the starting memory address for the read operation. The
bit/word count field specifies the number of memory object units to be read.
The payload of the corresponding response has two slightly different fields, byte
count and data. The byte count specifies the length of the data in bytes. The
data field contains the values of the memory objects that were read. In addition
to memory references, the payload of a write message has fields that specify the
values that are to be written.
The Modbus protocol does not defend itself in any way against a rogue
master that sends commands to slaves. Furthermore, Modbus only relies on TCP
sequence numbers to provide session semantics and has no message integrity
defences, thus TCP session hijacking [7] is quite straightforward.
Modbus over TCP/IP has long-term session semantics – the protocol simply
involves separate two-message query-response sequences. However, the Unitron-
ics PLCs we tested only accept a single TCP connection at a time on port 502.
Therefore, an attacker attempting to control an already-controlled PLC would
need to either hijack the existing TCP connection [7] and inject spoofed packets
into the stream, or reset the existing connection and create a new connection.
PLCs that allow multiple concurrent connections on port 502 are susceptible to
much simpler attacks.
2.2 Electrical Distribution
An electricity supply chain is usually divided into three subsystems: generation,
transmission, and distribution, as depicted in Figure 1. Electricity is transported
5along high voltage transmission lines (the transmission network) over long dis-
tances, from generation sites to major distribution points. The transmission lines
are connected to distribution substations. At a distribution substation, a substa-
tion transformer takes the incoming transmission-level voltage (138 to 765 kV)
and steps it down to several distribution primary circuits (“medium-voltage”
circuits, 600V to 35kV), which fan out from the substation. Close to each end
user, a distribution transformer takes the medium-voltage and steps it further
down to a low-voltage secondary circuit (commonly 120/240V). In this paper
we focus on the distribution subsystem, between the substation and distribution
transformers—which is precisely the subsystem impacted during the Ukranian
cyber-attacks [27,28].
For improved reliability, distribution circuits are often provided with “tie
switches” to other circuits which are normally open (i.e., disconnected). If a
fault occurs on one of the circuits, the tie switches can be closed (connected)
to let electricity flow into the faulted circuit, and to allow some portion of the
service to be restored. The tie switches can be operated either manually, or
automatically from the SCADA system interface. These switches, also called
switchgears, may be simple open-air isolator switches or may be gas-insulated.
2.3 Adversary Model
Our underlying threat model is loosely based on the Dolev-Yao threat model [14]:
The adversary may overhear and intercept all traffic regardless of its source and
destination. More precisely, we assume the adversary has a Man-In-The-Middle
(MITM) position between the HMI and all the PLCs. The adversary can inject,
delete, and delay arbitrary packets with any source and destination addresses on
the communication channels it controls. Consequently, the adversary can also
replay previously overheard messages, or maniplulate messages in transit. In
particular the adversary can take over the HMI and issue control messages. The
objective of the adversary is to manipulate the SCADA network to achieve an
impact on the physical world.
We further assume that the adversary has in-depth knowledge of the architec-
ture of the SCADA network and the various PLCs as well as sufficient knowledge
of the physical process and the means to manipulate it via the SCADA system.
Thus the adversary has the ability to fabricate messages that would result in
real-world physical damage.
In our experiments we implemented a somewhat weaker type of attacker: our
attack system has network access between the HMI and PLCs, and implements
simultaneous MITM attacks against multiple HMI-PLC communication chan-
nels. However, Our attack tool is near-stateless and does not track or modify the
TCP sequence numbers. Hence our attacks do not inject fabricated messages or
drop legitimate ones: our attack tool only modifies the contents of pre-existing
messages. Despite this self imposed restriction, our attacks are all successful, and
undetectable by suggested anomaly–detection systems.
6Fig. 2: A screenshot of the HMI panel. We see the substation is on the right, and
2 radial distribution lines: the top line (purple, via RTU 01–06) and the bottom
line (blue, via RTU 11,10, 09). RTU 07 and 08 control the switchgears that tie
the two lines: both are shown as open (disconnected). The numbers below each
RTU show the current (113.91A and 180.76A at the line heads, dropping to
11.39A at RTU 04). At the two line heads (RTU 01, 11) the HMI also shows the
voltage (23.18KV) displayed.
2.4 The Test Lab
The electric company test lab consists of 11 Unitronics V130 PLCs, controlled
by a Cimplicity version 9.5 HMI running on a Microsoft Windows 2012 server.
The HMI and the PLCs are connected to separate VLANs and separated by
Check Point 4000 appliance R77.30 firewall.
The test lab emulates a substation with 2 radial distribution lines, that are
interconnected by tie switches. Moreover, along each line there are several addi-
tional switchgears, see Figure 2. In total there are 11 PLCs, each controlling a
switchgear: each PLC reports back to the HMI the voltage and current flowing
through it, and the switchgear state (open/closed), and accepts commands to
open or close the switchgear.
The distribution system controlled by the PLCs is simulated by a separate
PLC (the S-PLC) - which the switchgear PLCs interface with. Whenever a switch
attempts to read a sensor value (e.g., current), the S-PLC provides the required
value. The sensor values reported by the S-PLC are based on measurements
taken at real switchgears that are deployed at a certain radial circuit of our local
electric company’s network.
The switchgears that are controlled by RTU_07 and RTU_08 in Figure 2
are the tie switches and are initially disconnected. The initial state of all the
other switchgears is connected.
The HMI runs two separate polling threads that monitor the eleven PLCs
using the Modbus protocol. The polling threads repeatedly send the same three
read-requests to get register values from each one of the PLCs. The PLCs all run
7Fig. 3: Network diagram of the test lab
the same control logic and expose the same Modbus memory layout: in particular
the current value is stored in register #130 and the voltage value is stored in
register #131.
In this environment, and indeed in the electric company’s real HMI, switch-
gears are only operated manually from the HMI: If the operator observes a
fault, such as current and voltage dropping to zero, she can open or close the
switchgears by clicking on the HMI screen. Such operator actions are realized by
corresponding Modbus ‘write’ packets that are sent from the HMI to the proper
PLC. Note that in the test lab, the S-PLC reacts to such write events by up-
dating all the subsequent current and voltage values that will be reported to all
the relevant PLCs to be consistent with the system state following the operator
action.
3 The Attack Tool
3.1 Gaining Network Access
There are many ways for an attacker with network access to place itself in a
MITM position. In our attack tool we chose to implement a well known ARP
poisoning attack (cf. [2]). Using ARP poisoning obviously makes the attack tool
detectable to standard low level Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS).
However, our focus is on semantic SCADA-aware anomaly detection, so we as-
sume the attacker is able to bypass the NIDS somehow. In our experiments we
realized that the HMI occasionally receives ARP messages, triggered by other
network connections, causing its ARP table to recover. Hence the attack tool has
to keep sending the spoofed ARP messages (in our case, once every 2 seconds
was sufficient).
8Fig. 4: The architecture of the attack tool
In order to record the attacks’ progress, we placed 2 traffic sniffers, one on
each of the VLANs (Sniffer 1 and Sniffer 2 in Figure 3).
The architecture of the attack tool is depicted in Figure 4. It comprises of: an
Arp poisener that crafts and sends the spoofed-ARP messages to the HMI, an
Unrelated Packet Filter (UPF) that just forwards these packets (untouched) to
their original destination, a Dispatcher that creates a PLC attacker (composed
of 2 threads, sharing state, per each direction of the traffic) per each PLC that
needs to be attacked. An IAML parser that accepts an IAML script, parses
it and transfers the needed parameters to the Dispatcher and the UPF, and a
Network filter that filters proper packets from the HMI VLAN and sends them
to the appropriate PLC attacker. The Network filter is based on the Pcap.Net
.NET wrapper for WinPcap.
3.2 Near-Stateless Manipulation of Modbus
Modifying the message length in the Modbus stream is a relatively “noisy” at-
tack action. SCADA-aware anomaly detection that has even minimal Modbus
understanding can flag messages with unusual lengths. Further, injecting mes-
sages into a hijacked connection is also detectable by either a network–aware
approach (if the message timing is unusual) or by a protocol–aware approach
(if the function code or arguments are unusual). Therefore, to demonstrate the
power of our attacks we elected to make our attack tool stateless at the trans-
port layer: it does not track or modify the TCP sequence numbers at all. Note
that this introduces a significant limitation on the attacker: e.g., it precludes
replacing a Modbus “read” query by a “write” query (which is the usual way to
implement commands)—simply because a “write” message is longer, due to the
additional written-values payload.
9(a) Effects of the attack as measured at the HMI
(b) Actual values during the attack as reported by the PLCs
Fig. 5: The zero values deception attack against an ICS of an electric distribution
system. The attack sends zero values for the current and voltage reported simul-
taneously by RTU_01 - RTU_06 (denoted here as PLC1–PLC6 respectively),
causing the HMI to present a view consistent with a fault on the top line.
However our tool is not totally stateless: As we shell see, we wish to modify
the values reported to the HMI in PLC responses of selected messages. Impor-
tantly, the Modbus response messages do not carry the read register addresses;
they carry only the read data values, while the register addresses are present in
the HMI’s query message. Thus when the attack tool matches a query message
of interest, it places that query’s Modbus Transaction ID (TID) into a state vari-
able; when the corresponding response message, with the same TID, is matched
on the same connection, the attack tool modifies its content.
4 Semantic Attacks against Electric Distribution SCADA
4.1 Zero Values Deception Attack
Our first deception scenario is illustrated in Figure 5. The attacker invokes the
attack twice (first for 18 seconds between 151.8 - 169.8 sec, and second for 14
seconds, between 359.53 - 373.53 sec). During each one of these attacks the
attacker simultaneously changes the values of the registers (#130 and #131)
that hold the current and the voltage reported by six PLCs to be zeros. The
victim PLCs are those controlling the top line (recall Figure 2): RTU 01–06.
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Fig. 6: The HMI panel showing a disconnection in the top radial line. Note the
voltage of 0.0KV at RTU_01, the missing current value at RTUs 02–06, and the
white color of the line. In such a scenario the operator would typically open the
switchgear at RTU 01 and close the ties at RTU 07, 08 to attempt to supply the
top line from the bottom line.
The bottom graph of Figure 5 shows the true current and voltage values as
recorded by Sniffer 2 on the PLC VLAN. The top graph shows the values of the
same registers as recorded by Sniffer 1 and observed at the HMI.
This attack causes the HMI to display a view in which RTU_01 - RTU_06
all show zero current - as in Figure 6. This view is consistent with a natural fault
on the top line – and causes the operator to implement unneeded remediation
steps, that are expensive and possibly harmful. Note that the attack is super-
stealthy: SCADA-aware anomaly detection is blind to such an attack, since the
attack mimics a natural fault, which is a planned-for scenario and does not, in
itself, signify an attack.
4.2 A Multi-stage Attack
Our main attack is more elaborate, and aims to interfere with the operator’s reac-
tion to a fake fault. In this attack scenario we implemented a stealthy multi-stage
deception attack, see Figure 7. The attack has two main stages: the first stage
is the Zero values deception attack described in the previous section. Looking at
the HMI pannel (depicted at Figure 6) the operator is deceived to believe that
the top radial circuit is disconnected. This motivates the operator to start dis-
connecting and reconnecting switchgears according to the operating procedures.
This is where the second stage of the attack comes into action. In this stage,
whenever the operator issues a switchgear open/close command, the attack tool
replaces it with the opposite command.
The bottom graph of Figure 7 shows the actual values (of current and voltage)
recorded at the different PLCs, and the top graph shows the manipulated values
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(a) Effects of the attack as measured at the HMI
(b) Actual values during the attack as reported by the PLCs
Fig. 7: The multi-stage attack – the attack starts at time 195.8 with a zero-
values attack. The second stage executing the “opposite operation” attack starts
at 231.3 and ends at 270.4, with operator commands at times 231.3 and 246.6.
The icons at the top edge of the graphs indicate the Open and Close commands
to the switchgears.
observed at the HMI. The two graphs also indicate the open/close actions by
small icons: the top graph shows the intended operator actions at the HMI
(Open at time 231.3 and Close at time 246.6), and the bottom graph shows
the icons for the reversed action received and executed by the PLCs. Note that
the attack also fakes current and voltage values that are consistent with the
intended operator actions: after the Open command the attack starts returning
current values computed as “nominal − actual”, where “nominal” is a fixed per
PLC constant; this shows the operator that the trouble shooting has some effect.
Then after the Close command (at time 246.6) the attack tool reports “nominal”
current values on all the PLCs—while in fact the circuit is disconnected and
customers are experiencing a blackout. Again, note how stealthy the attack is:
all Modbus messages are on schedule, using normal functions and arguments,
with designed-for, semantically reasonable, data values.
4.3 A Half-duplex Attack
Recall that the zero-values attack of section 4.1 required the attacker to modify
values in responses from the PLC to the HMI. In this section we describe an
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attack that is equivalent to the zero-values attack, except it requires a simpler
setup by the attacker: Here the attacker acts as a MITM only on the traffic
that flows from the HMI to all the PLCs while the PLC-to-HMI responses are
unaltered. Hence the attacker is unable to directly set data values to zero in
PLC responses. To achieve an attack in this scenario, query messages (from the
HMI to the PLC) reading the current and voltage values are modified to access
registers whose addresses are shifted by 1. As a result, during the attack, the
shifted register-values sent by the PLCs are interpreted at the HMI as the values
of the corresponding preceding registers—the HMI interprets the voltage value
as the current, and the content of register #132 (which is 0) is interpreted as
voltage-value, again fooling the operator into deducing that a fault occurred. We
omit the graphs.
Note that this attack can be detected by a protocol-aware anomaly detection
[19,24] as long as the detector is located at the network segment where the PLCs
reside, since the attacker modifies the accessed register addresses, which creates
unknown symbols in the GW model [19].
5 The ICS Attack Markup Language
We defined a new formalism for specifying a concrete execution of an attack, an
ICS Attack Markup Language which we called an IAML. IAML enables planning
and implementation of a multi-stage, multi-PLC, simultaneous attacks on an ICS
without any a priori programming knowledge. It uses a modular approach, where
a module represents an attack that changes a certain type of packet under certain
conditions. Modules can be linked together to create multi-stage attacks. The
relationships among modules are specified through the conditions and changes of
local and global stages. IAML is accompanied by a library of predicates, which
function as a vocabulary to describe the properties of attack modules and stages.
5.1 Syntax and Elements
In order to configure the attack tool in a data-driven manner, we designed the
ICS Attack Markup Language (IAML). IAML is written in XML – Listing 1.1 in
the appendix shows the IAML syntax with the basic elements. The root <IAML>
tag has one sub-element: <Change>.
A <Change> tag is the basic unit for specifying changes to a SCADA packet.
The <Change> tag accepts one attribute: PacketToChange (“REQUEST” if the
packet to be changed is a request packet, “RESPONSE” in case a response packet
needs to be changed). Note that a <Change> of the “RESPONSE” may actually
match the query, and later trigger a modification of the corresponding response.
The <Change> tag has two sub-elements: <Query> and <NewValues>.
The <Query> element supplies the match criteria identifying the packet to
manipulate. <Query> has one sub-element <QueryEntry>. <QueryEntry> accepts
a pair of attributes: Key and Value. One QueryEntry is mandatory: its Key is
“TYPE” and its Value is either “REQUEST” or “RESPONSE” (it can be set to
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“REQUEST” even when the PacketToChange is of “RESPONSE” type, in case
the match criteria is given using the request arguments).
Other optional <QueryEntry>s are the following:
“PLC_IP”, “GLOBAL_STAGE”, “LOCAL_STAGE”, “FUNCTION”,
“WORD_COUNT”, and “ADDRESS”.
The values corresponding to these keys are:
– “PLC_IP” - is the IP address of a PLC.
– “GLOBAL_STAGE” - an integer representing the current global stage of
the attack. This is needed, for instance, to synchronize the move from the
zero-values deception stage to the opposite command stage of the exemplified
multi-stage attack.
– “LOCAL_STAGE” - an integer denoting the current PLC-local stage of the
attack. This is needed for finer manipulation on each PLC separately.
– “FUNCTION” - the original function code of the SCADA packet to be
matched.
– “WORD_COUNT” - the word count in the SCADA packet, e.g., in the case
of a Modbus read request - the number of words to read.
– “ADDRESS” - the register number to be matched. Note that the Modbus
request may read a range of several registers, and the “ADDRESS” may refer
to a register inside the range, e.g., if the packet specifies a read of 4 words
starting from address #129, then address #130 is within this range.
The <NewValues> element specifies the change to be made to the SCADA
packet. <NewValues> has one sub-element <NewValueEntry>, that accepts a pair
of attributes: Key and Value. Key may be equal to: “GLOBAL_STAGE”, “LO-
CAL_STAGE”, “FUNCTION”, “STARTING_ADDRESS”, or “DATA”. Some of
these keys are already described above. The others are:
– “STARTING_ADDRESS” - the address explicitly specified in the SCADA
packet.
– “DATA” - the value to be placed inside the SCADA packet.
IAML allows setting the new value as a simple mathematical expression,
which is allowed to refer to constants and to the actually-read values of that
register: These values will be the new values that would be written in the mod-
ified SCADA packet. If multiple values are specified they should be separated
by commas. The original value is denoted by ’X’. Hence, the new value can be
an arithmetic expression, based on ’X’, such as: ’X+5’. The language allows for
multiple new-values (or arithmetic expressions) each replacing a corresponding
original value and separated by a comma.
6 Related Work
6.1 Attacks against ICS
Digital attacks that cause physical destruction of equipment do occur [20]. Most
recently, cyber-attacks on SCADA systems controlling electrical distribution
14
have caused wide-spread blackouts in Ukraine [27,28]. Perhaps most well known
is the attack on an Iranian nuclear facility in 2010 (Stuxnet) to sabotage cen-
trifuges at a uranium enrichment plant. The Stuxnet malware [16,26] worked by
changing centrifuge operating parameters in a pattern that damaged the equip-
ment – while sending normal status messages to the HMI. In 2014, the German
Federal Office for Information Security announced a cyber attack at an unnamed
German steel mill, where hackers manipulated and disrupted control systems to
such a degree that a blast furnace could not be properly shut down, resulting in
“massive”-though unspecified-damage [13].
Byres et al. [8] describe the application of the attack tree methodology to
SCADA communication systems based on the common Modbus protocol stack.
The authors identify eleven possible attacker goals with their respective technical
difficulty, possible severity of impact and likelihood of detection. In particular
they noted that an attacker can perform a Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack
between a PLC and HMI and “feed” the HMI with misleading data, allegedly
coming from the PLC – which is what we implemented.
In 2009 Fovino et al. [17] showed that malware was able to disrupt or even
seize control of vital sensors and actuators. Semantic attack scenarios on ICSs
are described by [18,31] for a system with a pipe in which high pressure steam
or fluid flows. The pressure is regulated by two valves. An attacker capable of
sending packets to the PLCs can force one valve to complete closure, and force
the other to open. Each of these ICS commands is perfectly legal when considered
individually, however when sent in an abnormal order they can cause a ‘water
hammer’ and bring the system to a critical state. Another example [31] shows
an attack scenario where a system-wide water hammer effect is caused. A fluid
in motion is forced to stop or change direction suddenly, resulting in pressure
surge or wave propagation in the pipe. The water hammer is caused simply by
opening or closing major control valves too rapidly. This can result in a large
number of simultaneous main breaks.
6.2 Anomaly Detection in ICS
Surveys of techniques related to learning and detection of anomalies in critical
control systems can be found in [3,4,11]. While most of the current commercial
network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are signature-based, i.e., they rec-
ognize an attack when it matches a previously defined signature, anomaly-based
NIDS “are based on the belief that an intruder’s behavior will be noticeably
different from that of a legitimate user” [34]. All anomaly detection approaches
below do not distinguish between malicious events and faulty events — and none
of them is able to detect our attacks.
Sommer et al. [38] discuss the surprising imbalance between the extensive
amount of research on machine learning-based anomaly detection versus the
lack of operational deployments of such systems. One of the reasons for that,
by the authors, is that the machine learning anomaly detection systems are
lacking the ability to bypass the “semantic gap”: The system “understands” that
an abnormal activity has occurred, but it cannot produce a message that will
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elaborate, helping the operator differentiate between an abnormal activity and
an attack.
Network–Aware Detection. Basic anomaly detection models for SCADA sys-
tems only consider network and OS-level events. Yang et al. [41] used an Auto
Associative Kernel Regression (AAKR) model coupled with the Statistical Prob-
ability Ratio Test (SPRT) and applied them on a SCADA system. The model
used numerous indicators representing network traffic and hardware-operating
statistics to predict the ‘normal’ behavior.
Barbosa et al. [5,6] analyzed SCADA traces they collected at two different
water treatment and distribution facilities. They concluded that SCADA traffic
presents remarkably regular time series, due to the fact that the majority of the
traffic sources generate data in a periodical fashion. They selected only the high
energy frequencies for the anomaly detection phase.
Protocol–Aware Detection. More advanced anomaly detection systems rely
on deep-packet-inspection and consider the ICS control protocol’s meta-data,
modeling command sequences, and argument addresses.
Model-based anomaly detection for SCADA systems, and specifically for
Modbus traffic, was introduced by Cheung et al. [12]. They designed a multi-
algorithm intrusion detection appliance for Modbus/TCP with pattern anomaly
recognition, Bayesian analysis of TCP headers and stateful protocol monitoring,
complemented with customized Snort rules [36]. In subsequent work, Valdes et
al. [40] incorporated adaptive statistical learning methods into the system to
detect for communication patterns among hosts and traffic patterns.
Goldenberg & Wool [19] developed a model-based approach (the GW model)
for Network anomaly detection based on the normal traffic pattern in Modbus
SCADA networks using a Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) to represent the
cyclic traffic. The SCADA messages are modeled both in isolation and also by
their sequence order. Subsequently, Kleinmann et al. [22,23] demonstrated that
a similar methodology is successful also in SCADA systems running the Siemens
S7 protocol.
Caselli et al. [10] proposed a methodology to model sequences of SCADA
protocol messages as Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMCs). Based on data
from three different Dutch utilities the authors found that only 35%-75% of the
possible transitions in the DTMC were observed. This strengthens the observa-
tions of [5,19,22] of a substantial sequentiality in the SCADA communications.
However, unlike [19,22] they did not observe clear cyclic message patterns. The
authors hypothesized that the difficulties in finding clear sequences is due to
the presence of several threads in the HMI’s operating system that multiplex
requests on the same TCP stream.
Kleinmann et al. [23,24,25] introduced a modeling approach for multiplexed
SCADA streams, using Statechart DFAs: the Statechart includes multiple DFAs,
one per cyclic pattern. Each DFA is built using the learning stage of the GW
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model. Following this model, incoming traffic is de-multiplexed into sub-channels
and sent to the respective DFAs.
Process–Aware Detection. These anomaly detection methods are based on
process invariants: mathematical relationships among physical properties of the
process controlled by the PLCs. Several publications [9,30,39] explain that an
IDS that models only the protocol meta-data (commands and arguments) is
not sufficient, since attacks can be mounted using legitimate control commands,
but with attacker-selected data values. To combat such attacks they suggest
modeling both the physical process and the continuous control function. Based
on measurements of the state of the process, the models predict the control’s
response and its effect on the state, and flag deviations from the predicted state.
Fovino et al. [18] use detailed knowledge of the industrial process’ control to
generate a system virtual image representing the PLCs of a monitored system.
The virtual image is updated using a periodic active synchronization procedure
and via a feed generated by the intrusion detection system (i.e., known intrusion
signatures).
Sa et al. [37] proposed a covert attack against ICS for service degradation,
which is planned based on observation how the physical system behaves. Their
simulation results demonstrated that attack is able to affect, in a covert and
accurate way, the physical behavior of an ICS. They argue that an approach re-
garding to the covertness of attacks on ICS must be analyzed from two aspects
simultaneously: the physical and the cybernetic aspects. Properties of the phys-
ical process can be used to predict and then confirm that the control commands
sent to the field were executed correctly and that the information coming from
sensors is consistent with the expected behavior of the system.
Hadziosmanovic et al. [21] used the logs generated by the control application
running on the HMI to detect anomalous patterns of user actions on process
control application. The focus of this work was on the threats that can be trig-
gered by a single user action. The authors acknowledged that “an attacker could
manipulate logs by sending false data to the control application”. This model is
also susceptible to replay attacks.
Lin et al. [29] combine system knowledge of both the control network (ex-
tracting control commands from SCADA network packets) and the physical in-
frastructure in power grid (obtaining measurements from sensors in substations)
to help IDS to estimate execution consequences of control commands, thus to
reveal attacker’s malicious intentions. The authors claimed that their semantic
analysis provides reliable detection of malicious commands with a small amount
of analysis time.
Erez et al. [15] developed an anomaly detection system that detects irregular
changes in SCADA control registers’ values. The system is based on an automatic
classifier that identifies several classes of PLC registers (Sensor, Counter and
Constant registers). Parameterized behavior models were built for each class. In
its learning phase, the system instantiates the model for each register. During
the enforcement phase the system detects deviations from the model.
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Mo et al. [32] as well as Pasqualetti et al. [35] investigated the detection and
prevention of deception and replay attacks. They concluded that certain types
of attacks are undetectable by using their attack models.
7 Conclusions and Counter Measures
This work presented a class of semantic network-based attacks against SCADA
systems which are undetectable by both protocol–aware and process–aware ano-
maly detection. After hijacking the communication channels between the HMI
and PLCs, our attacks cause the HMI to present a fake view of the industrial
process, deceiving the human operator into taking manual actions. Our most
advanced attack also manipulates the operator’s commands reversing their se-
mantic meaning while causing the HMI to present a view that is consistent with
the attempted operator directions. The attacks are totally stealthy since the
message sizes and timing, the command sequences, and the data values of the
ICS’s state all remain legitimate. They appear as natural fault conditions that
the SCADA system is designed for, and the human operator is trained to handle.
We implemented and tested several attack scenarios in the realistic test lab
of our local electric company. We developed a real-time security assessment tool,
that can simultaneously manipulate the communication to multiple PLCs, and
cause the HMI to display a coherent system–wide fake view. Our tool is config-
ured with a new IAML language we designed. Our multi-stage semantic attacks
all successfully fooled the operator and brought the system to states of blackout
and possible equipment damage.
We argue that current intrusion detection and anomaly detection systems
are fundamentally unable to detect the stealthy deception attacks we described.
In fact, once the attacker is positioned as MITM, the traffic at both the HMI
and the PLC sides looks perfectly normal—because it is perfectly normal. In
our opinion the only real countermeasure against such attacks is to secure the
communication channel via cryptographic means. E.g., by adding data integrity
protections such as digital signatures or message authentication codes to block
the attacker’s ability to modify packets. Nevertheless, we believe that ongoing
research into anomaly detection for ICS is still very valuable: with such systems
in place, the attacker is restricted to onlymount super-stealthy deception attacks
like ours, and cannot mount simpler and more direct attacks without risk of
detection.
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Appendix: Example of an IAML script
Listing 1.1: The IAML script of the multistage attack on a PLC
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf−8"?>
2 <IAML protocol="MODBUS">
3 <Change PacketToChange="REQUEST">
4 <Query>
5 <QueryEntry Key="TYPE" Value="REQUEST"/>
6 <QueryEntry Key="FUNCTION" Value="WRITE_MULTIPLE_REGISTERS"
/>
7 <QueryEntry Key="ADDRESS" Value="129"/>
8 <QueryEntry Key="WORD_COUNT" Value="1"/>
9 </Query>
10 <NewValues>
11 <NewValueEntry Key="DATA" Value="41−x"/>
12 </NewValues>
13 </Change>
14 <Change PacketToChange="RESPONSE">
15 <Query>
16 <QueryEntry Key="TYPE" Value="REQUEST"/>
17 <QueryEntry Key="FUNCTION" Value="READ_HOLDING_REGISTERS"/>
18 <QueryEntry Key="ADDRESS" Value="129"/>
19 <QueryEntry Key="WORD_COUNT" Value="1"/>
20 </Query>
21 <NewValues>
22 <NewValueEntry Key="GLOBAL_STAGE" Value="1"/>
23 <NewValueEntry Key="DATA" Value="41−x"/>
24 </NewValues>
25 </Change>
26 <Change PacketToChange="RESPONSE">
27 <Query>
28 <QueryEntry Key="GLOBAL_STAGE" Value="0"/>
29 <QueryEntry Key="TYPE" Value="REQUEST"/>
30 <QueryEntry Key="FUNCTION" Value="READ_HOLDING_REGISTERS"/>
31 <QueryEntry Key="ADDRESS" Value="129"/>
32 <QueryEntry Key="WORD_COUNT" Value="4"/>
33 </Query>
34 <NewValues>
35 <NewValueEntry Key="DATA" Value="0 ,0 ,0 ,x"/>
36 </NewValues>
37 </Change>
38 <Change PacketToChange="RESPONSE">
39 <Query>
40 <QueryEntry Key="GLOBAL_STAGE" Value="0"/>
41 <QueryEntry Key="TYPE" Value="REQUEST"/>
42 <QueryEntry Key="FUNCTION" Value="READ_HOLDING_REGISTERS"/>
43 <QueryEntry Key="ADDRESS" Value="129"/>
44 <QueryEntry Key="WORD_COUNT" Value="16"/>
45 </Query>
46 <NewValues>
47 <NewValueEntry Key="DATA" Value="0 ,0 ,0 ,x , x , x , x , x , x , x , x , x , x ,
x , x , x"/>
48 </NewValues>
49 </Change>
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50 <Change PacketToChange="RESPONSE">
51 <Query>
52 <QueryEntry Key="PLC_IP" Value="172.27.21.35"/>
53 <QueryEntry Key="GLOBAL_STAGE" Value="1"/>
54 <QueryEntry Key="TYPE" Value="REQUEST"/>
55 <QueryEntry Key="FUNCTION" Value="READ_HOLDING_REGISTERS"/>
56 <QueryEntry Key="ADDRESS" Value="129"/>
57 <QueryEntry Key="WORD_COUNT" Value="4"/>
58 </Query>
59 <NewValues>
60 <NewValueEntry Key="DATA" Value="0,12274−x,2334−x,432−x"/>
61 </NewValues>
62 </Change>
63 <Change PacketToChange="RESPONSE">
64 <Query>
65 <QueryEntry Key="PLC_IP" Value="172.27.21.35"/>
66 <QueryEntry Key="GLOBAL_STAGE" Value="1"/>
67 <QueryEntry Key="TYPE" Value="REQUEST"/>
68 <QueryEntry Key="FUNCTION" Value="READ_HOLDING_REGISTERS"/>
69 <QueryEntry Key="ADDRESS" Value="129"/>
70 <QueryEntry Key="WORD_COUNT" Value="16"/>
71 </Query>
72 <NewValues>
73 <NewValueEntry Key="DATA" Value="0,12274−x,2334−x,432−x , x , x
, x , x , x , x , x , x , x , x , x , x"/>
74 </NewValues>
75 </Change>
76 </IAML>
